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When the great Israel Baal Shem Tov saw misfortune threatening the Jews, it
was his custom to go into a certain part of the forest to meditate. There he
would light a fire, say a special prayer, and the miracle would be accomplished
and the misfortune averted.
Later when his disciple, the celebrated Maggid of Mezeritch, had occasion,
for the same reason, to intercede with heaven, he would go to the same place
in the forest and say: ‘‘Master of the Universe, listen! I do not know how to
light the fire, but I am still able to say the prayer.’’ And again the miracle
would be accomplished.
Still later, Moshe-Leib of Sassov, in order to save his people once more,
would go into the forest and say: ‘‘I do not know the prayer, but I know the
place and this must be sufficient.’’ It was sufficient and the miracle was
accomplished.
Then it fell to Israel of Rizhin to overcome misfortune. Sitting in his
armchair, his head in his hands, he spoke to God: ‘‘I am unable to light the fire
and I do not know the prayer; I cannot even find the place in the forest. All I
can do is tell the story, and this must be sufficient.’’And it was sufficient.
It no longer is. The proof is that the threat has not been averted. Perhaps we are no
longer able to tell the story. Could all of us be guilty? Even the survivors? Especially the
survivors?’1
I INTRODUCTION
Gillian Rose uses the above midrash – which is derived from the work of
Martin Buber and Elie Wiesel – to address the challenges confronting
survivors. Rose contends that survivors would be guilty if they remained
‘self-defined solely as survivors; guilty’ because they would be fixed in ‘a
counter–identification’:2
To survive – to live again – demands a new tale: a new prayer to be found, a
new polity to be founded. It demands a willingness to participate in power
and its legitimate violence for the sake of the good.3
I wish to employ this use of midrash by Rose to interrogate the
concept of transformation of the South African legal system and the
* Judge of the High Court, Cape of Good Hope Provincial Division.
1 G Rose Mourning Becomes the Law (1996) at 99–100.
2 Ibid at 100.
3 Ibid.
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manner in which the concept has been implemented in the early
jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court. It is in these early develop-
ments of constitutional jurisprudence that Judge Ackermann played a
critical role.
This paper focuses on the manner, in which the Constitutional Court,
in its early jurisprudence, set the foundations for the ‘transformative’
development of South African private law. The body of private law
which was inherited from apartheid eschewed any recourse to the
concepts adopted in public law. Private lawyers were generally con-
cerned with purity of concept rather than an interrogation of the power
relationships which were reflected, reinforced and reproduced through
those arrangements underpinned by private law. The Constitution4
promised an end to this insulation of private arrangements sanctioned by
law from judicial scrutiny.5 These developments posed the possibility of a
public meaning for private law; hence, how did the Court answer this
question? Before engaging in this investigation, it is necessary to refer,
albeit briefly, to the conceptual framework of adjudication which was
inherited by the post-apartheid judiciary when constitutional democracy
dawned in 1994.
The conventional narrative about the South African judiciary was that
a liberal bench dominated South African jurisprudence until the mid
1950’s. It was then replaced by a pro-executive judiciary which deferred
with great jurisprudential gusto to the policies developed by the National
Party after its 1948 electoral victory. Of course, the earlier ‘liberal’
tradition was not entirely obliterated. It lived on in the judgments of a
small group of exceptionally courageous and principled judges. But the
hegemony was enjoyed by the executive-minded, so carefully appointed
by the government.
Expressed in its most elegant form, this clash of approaches to
adjudication was constituted between common-law judges who sought
to preserve the liberal values which justified the nature of the common
law and plain-fact judges who gave as wide a latitude to the output of
Parliament as was legally possible.6 For this latter group of judges, it was
the law as it exists in fact which was determinative of their task to apply
the law. The ultimate source of law-as-fact was Parliament. By contrast,
those judges, who throughout the apartheid era strove to protect civil
liberties and the rule of law against an arbitrary and capricious legal
system introduced by the National Party, viewed law as not merely a
4 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.
5 In particular see ss 8 and 39(2) of the Constitution .
6 The most penetrating scholarship in this field is by D Dyzenhaus Hard Cases in Wicked
Legal Systems: South African Law in the Perspective of Legal Philosophy (1991). See also D
Dyzenhaus ‘The disappearance of law’ (1990)107 SALJ 227.
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statutory scheme. Common-law values remained the bedrock of the legal
system, in that these values were the core of the legal system. The judicial
role was not simply a formalistic application of legal materials but,
wherever possible, entailed the substantive integration of common law
values into all legal materials.
So much for the conventional story. A further look at these models of
adjudication in South Africa reveals that the common-law approach to
adjudication as it developed in South Africa was derived primarily from
the early jurisprudence of Judges Rose-Innes, Solomon, Centlivres and
Schreiner. Arguably, these judges were libertarian by nature, in that they
eschewed state interference in the lives of individual citizens. Their
political worldview was based upon the night-watchman state which
guaranteed civil liberties and the freedom of each individual to act as an
autonomous being. Within this context, individuals were to be allowed
to develop their own politics with the least possible interference from the
state.7
By contrast, those judges whose approach to adjudication achieved
hegemony during the early 1960’s, when Lucas Steyn became the Chief
Justice, found no difficulty with the model of law as an instrument for
social engineering, particularly when that law was a product of
Parliament which was seen as the central political institution to which
judges invariably had to defer.
In 1994, South Africa commenced its constitutional journey. Neither
the libertarian nor the social engineering model was entirely appropriate
to the challenges of the text of the Constitution which was to govern
South Africa after 1994. The constitutional text which was now to be
given content was, in essence, a social democratic document. It imposed
a range of obligations upon the state. Its aim may be described as the
construction of a multi-cultural social democracy in South Africa. This is
evident from the following seven provisions of the text of the
Constitution:
(1) Section 9 of the Constitution supports the conception of substantive
equality in which the material conditions of citizens must be assessed
in the promotion of the equality guarantee. In addition, s 9(3)
contains a powerful anti-discrimination clause, which protects
citizens not only against discrimination on the grounds of race and
gender but also on the grounds of sexual orientation, age, belief,
opinion and, arguably, class.
(2) Section 8 provides for the horizontal application of the Bill of
Rights. In short, a horizontal application of the Bill of Rights means
7 Of course, all of this took place within a discourse saturated by race from which none of
these judges was entirely immune.
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that all power, whether sourced in the state or private organisations,
is subject to interrogation in terms of the provisions of the Bill of
Rights whenever this power is exercised in the public domain.
(3) Section 23 protects a range of labour rights, including the right to
strike and the right to organise collectively and to form trade unions.
(4) The Constitution contains a range of socio-economic rights,
particularly in s 26, the right to housing, and s 27, the right to
health. However interpreted, these clauses impose an obligation
upon the state to ensure that no socio-economic programme be
introduced without taking account of the priorities of the poorest of
the poor within society.
(5) Section 31 contains a guarantee of cultural rights and seeks to ensure
that cultural identity is protected.
(6) The foundational values of the text represent an amalgam of
equality, dignity and freedom. Taken together, these values are
different from the meaning of the parts. They need to be
harmonised into a coherent normative framework. It will thus be
argued, for example, that it is not possible to contend that the text
promotes an exclusively negative conception of freedom of the kind
developed most famously by Isaiah Berlin.8 If the values of equality,
dignity and freedom are taken together in order to construct a
coherent meaning for the foundation upon which the text is based,
an egalitarian vision of South African society emerges where neither
freedom without recognition of equality and dignity, nor, con-
versely, equality which crowds out freedom and individual dignity,
can be sustained.
(7) Section 36 contains a limitation clause. This ensures that none of the
rights in the Constitution must invariably trump the policy of the
democratically elected government. However, if any policy limits a
constitutionally entrenched right, the government has to show
adequate justification for the limitation. By ensuring that a culture
of justification rather than a juristocracy prevails, a balance between
constitutionalism and majoritarian democracy may be achieved. In
other words, the Constitution demands of judges that they examine
the justification for policy rather than seek to impose their own
policies, which would tilt the balance of power in favour of the
judiciary – an outcome which erodes democratic rule and invari-
ably, the legitimacy of the constitutional enterprise.
8 I Berlin ‘Two concepts of liberty’ in I Berlin Four Essays on Liberty (1969) at 118–72.
222 DIGNITY, FREEDOM AND THE POST-APARTHEID LEGAL ORDER
II THE FIRST INDICATIONS
In the very first judgment delivered by the Constitutional Court,
S v Zuma,9 the Constitutional Court was confronted with a challenge to
a provision in legislation which placed the onus of proof on the accused
in contra-distinction to the common-law presumption of innocence.
Section 25(3)(c) of the interim Constitution10 provided that: ‘Every
accused person shall have the right to a fair trial which shall include the
right . . . to be presumed innocent and to remain silent during plea
proceedings or trial and not to testify during trial’.
Significantly, Kentridge AJ, who delivered the judgment of a unani-
mous Court, said of these provisions:
The concepts embodied in these provisions are by no means an entirely new
departure in South African criminal procedure. The presumption of inno-
cence, the right of silence and the proscription of compelled confessions have
for 150 years or more been recognised as basic principles of our law, although
all of them have to a greater or lesser degree been eroded by statute and in
some cases by judicial decision. The resulting body of common law and
statute law forms part of the background to s 25.11
Later in his judgement, Kentridge AJ reinforced the point:
But even if the common law rule governing the admissibility of confessions is
a rule of evidence, it is, as I shall show, a rule which lies at the heart of the
important rights embodied in s 25. . . .12
This early approach to the Constitution was significant. It was
indicative of a view that the Constitution promised the restoration of
South African law to the pristine position of the common law which
could now be disentangled from the web of arbitrary and unfettered state
control which had characterised apartheid legislation. It was almost as if
the Constitution was not entirely necessary. Recourse to the common
law could promote the values of freedom inherent in a body of law that
was sourced in centuries of legal development. If Zuma gave a hint, more
was to come which afforded greater clues as to a reading of the common
law based on mourning.
9 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC).
10 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993.
11 S v Zuma (n 9) 650 para 12.
12 Ibid at 658 para 29.
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III TOWARDS A LIBERTARIAN INTERPRETATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION
In Ferreira,13 Ackermann J gave the right to freedom and security of the
person a broad meaning so that this provision could amount to a residual
protection of negative liberty. As he wrote:
The implication of this separate enumeration and independent protection of
specific freedom rights is of course that the freedom rights protected by
s 11(1) should more properly be designated ‘‘residual freedom rights’’.
Consequently, when it is alleged that any freedom right has been infringed,
the proper methodology would be first to determine whether the right
infringed is a specifically enumerated freedom right . . . If the alleged
infringement is not of an enumerated freedom right, then the enquiry will be
directed to determining whether a residual freedom right protected by s 11(1)
has been infringed.14
Later in his judgment, Judge Ackermann provided examples of where
this residual right would be effective:
One can think offhand of many prohibitions (such as an unqualified
prohibition against a possession of any firearm, the possession of liquor in any
form, the playing of sport on a Sunday, and a proscription of various activities
or where or when they may be carried out) which might be difficult to
challenge under the provisions of chapter 3 other than the s 11(1) residual
freedom rights, but would be unacceptable in an ‘‘open and democratic
society based on freedom and equality’’.15
Any possible doubt about Judge Ackermann’s idea of freedom is
dispelled by the fact that the judgment is dotted with references to the
concept of negative liberty developed by Isaiah Berlin. Judge Ackermann
cites Berlin’s negative concept of liberty as being involved
in the answer to the question, ‘‘What is the area within which the subject – a
person or a group of persons – is or should be left to do or be what he is able to
do or be, without interference by other persons?’’16
Agreed, Judge Ackermann does proceed to emphasise that,
a broad and generous interpretation of freedom does not deny or preclude the
constitutionally valid, and indeed essential, role of state intervention in the
economic as well as the civil and political spheres. On the contrary, State
13 Ferreira v Levin NO and Others; Vryenhoek and Others v Powell NO and Others 1996 (1) SA
984 (CC).
14 Ibid at 1019–20 para 57.
15 Ibid at 1023–24 para 67.
16 Ibid at 1016 para 52.
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intervention is essential to resolve the paradox of unlimited freedom (where
freedom ultimately destroys itself) in all these spheres.17
Further, he explains the idea of state intervention by reference to the
work of Karl Popper.18 Popper recognised the need to develop a social
democratic model to curb the unbridled excesses of economic power.
Judge Ackermann was aware of this problem, as can be seen in his careful
attempt to qualify the acceptance of negative liberty as so enthusiastically
applied in Lochner v New York,19 which approach, he contended, had no
place within South Africa.
A reader examining this series of qualifications is however justified in
asking why the residual right existing within the Constitution should be
that of negative freedom, particularly in a society where the imperative
towards equality was so clearly historically mandated.
The other members of the Court were not prepared to give the broad,
residual meaning to s 11 offered by Judge Ackermann. The president of
the Court, Judge Chaskalson, said:
It would in my view be highly anomalous to give to unenumerated rights
forming a ‘‘residue’’ in s 11(1) a higher status, subject to closer scrutiny, than a
right so important to freedom as privacy, which is subject only to the
‘‘reasonable’’ test.20
Judge Chaskalson did not find textual support for the conclusion
reached by Judge Ackermann. Indeed, in clear reference to the minority
judgment, Judge Chaskalson warned the Court to avoid the pitfall of
Lochner v New York:
We should not however construe s 11 so broadly that we overshoot the mark
and trespass upon terrain that is not rightly ours.21
Whatever the enthusiasm of Judge Ackermann for the concept of
negative liberty as an unenumerated right, and however strong his
conviction that it could be compatible with the forms of state
intervention envisaged in the Constitution, the other judges on the
Constitutional Court appeared to have serious doubts about this
enterprise. Significantly, the majority of the Court found that there was
no need to use s 11 to find that the impugned legislative provision was
unconstitutional. A complete answer could be found in the right to a fair
trial guaranteed by s 25(3), without the need to interrogate the s 11 right
to freedom.
17 Ibid at 1017 para 52 (emphasis in the original).
18 K Popper The Open Society and its Enemies Vol 2 (1962) 124–25.
19 198 US 45 (1905).
20 Ferreira v Levin NO (n 13) at 1086–87 para 174.
21 Ibid at 1090 para 183.
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Notwithstanding references to the role of the state as enshrined in the
Constitution, the approach of Judge Ackermann to negative liberty
displayed an absence of an analysis of power, save for a footnote reference
to Karl Popper which was never developed in the judgment. The
absence of power from his legal analyses and its effect upon legal
development became more evident in the next case to be examined.
IV DU PLESSIS v DE KLERK:22 THE HORIZONTALITY
DEBATE
Du Plessis v De Klerk afforded the Court an opportunity to examine a
comprehensive argument concerning the application of the Constitution
to private law. A newspaper had published a series of articles in which De
Klerk was alleged to have used private aircraft to provide illegal assistance
to UNITA during the Angolan war. He sued for defamation. The
newspaper raised a series of defences. It denied that the articles had meant
that De Klerk was involved in illegal activity, or that the articles were
defamatory of him. In the alternative, they contended that the subject
matter was of public interest. After the interim Constitution became law
on 7 October 1994, the newspaper applied to amend its plea to allege that
the publication of the articles had not been unlawful by reason of the
protection afforded in terms of s 15 of the interim Constitution,
containing the right to freedom of speech and expression which included
the freedom of the press and other media. This necessitated an
examination of whether the Bill of Rights applied to a dispute between
two private parties. The Court conceded that this issue of horizontal
application of the Bill of Rights had been hotly debated in South African
legal literature.23 The case could thus determine a critical question.
The majority judgement was written by Kentridge AJ. After a careful
and exhaustive analysis of the academic literature and comparative law he
concluded:
Chapter 3 [The Bill of Rights] does not have a general direct horizontal
application, but it may and should have an influence on the development of
the common law as it governs relations between individuals.24
Ackermann J concurred with this finding. He found support for his
judgment in particular in German jurisprudence for the conclusion that:
22 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC).
23 At the time, see A Cockrell ‘Horizontal application of the interim Bill of Rights’,
unpublished paper UCT, 1995; J De Waal ‘A comparative analysis of the provisions of German
origin in the Bill of Rights’ (1995) 11 SAJHR 1; A Cachalia et al Fundamental Rights in the New
Constitution (1994) at 19ff; S Woolman ‘Application’ in M Chaskalson et al Constitutional Law of
South Africa (1996) paras 10–11.
24 Du Plessis v De Klerk (n 22) 887 para 62.
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The framers of our Constitution did not intend that the chapter 3
fundamental rights should, save where the formulation of a particular right
expressly or by necessary implication otherwise indicates, apply directly to
legal relations between private persons.25
Judge Ackermann conceded that s 35(3) of the interim Constitution,
which provided for an indirect ‘radiating’ effect of the Bill of Rights on
the development of the pre-constitutional common law and statute law,
would ensure that traditional concepts such as public policy, boni mores,
unlawfulness, reasonableness and fairness would continue to influence
the common law. He concluded:
The common law of this country has, in the past, proved to be flexible and
adaptable, and I am confident that it can also meet this new constitutional
mandate.26
Judge Ackermann then went on to sketch, albeit briefly, the
jurisprudential assumptions which underpin this conclusion:
Direct application of the chapter 3 rights, quite apart from the undesirable
consequences already mentioned will cast onto the Constitutional Court the
formidable ultimate task of reforming the common law of this country, a
consequence which could not have been intended by the drafters. It turns the
Constitution, contrary to the historical evolution of constitutional individual
rights protection, also into a code of obligations for private individuals, with
no indication in the Constitution as to how clashes between rights and duties
are to be resolved, or how clashing rights are to be ‘‘balanced’’. . . . It would
also be undesirable in the broader constitutional sense, pre-empting in many
cases Parliament’s role of reforming common law by ordinary legislation.27
The judgment refers to the flexibility and the adaptability of the
common law. This echoes Judge Ackermann’s professor at law school,
the legendary academic J C De Wet who, in 1948, had written an
important article in which he argued against the codification of South
African private law. The parallels in reasoning are illuminating. Professor
De Wet argued that the codification of South African law would stultify
its future development. He suggested that the major source of South
African private law, Roman Law, had transcended civilisations and a
myriad of historical developments. Its structure was universal and its
concepts adaptable to the exigencies of any time. Concepts such as good
faith, reasonableness and wrongfulness could be adapted to meet the
needs of any generation in a manner far superior to a codification of the
25 Ibid at 904 para 106.
26 Ibid at 906 para 110.
27 Ibid at 906 para 112.
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law which was likely to ossify the law rather than facilitating its
development.28 In Ackermann’s reasoning the Constitution now
replaced a possible code, but the similarities of approach to the defence of
the common law against being subsumed under an all encompassing text
are clear.
Most of the judges followed this approach. There was, however, a
significant minority judgment written by Judge Kriegler, who rejected
the use of comparative law, particularly American constitutional law, to
support the narrow conclusion of the majority. As he wrote:
We do not operate under a constitution in which the avowed purpose of the
drafters was to place limitations on government control. Our Constitution
aims at establishing freedom and equality in a grossly disparate society.29
Judge Madala developed this approach even further. He stated:
Ours is a multi-racial, multi-cultural, multi-lingual society in which the
ravages of apartheid disadvantage and inequality are just immeasurable. The
extent of the oppressive measures in South Africa was not confined to
government/individual relations, but equally to individual/individual rela-
tions. In its effort to create a new order, our Constitution must have been
intended to address these oppressive undemocratic practices at all levels. In
my view our Constitution starts at the lowest level and attempts to reach the
furthest in its endeavours to restructure the dynamics in a previously racist
society.30
In contrast to the approaches adopted by Judges Kentridge and
Ackermann, Judges Kriegler and Madala understood the context in
which our Constitution was litigated and the influential manner in which
private power helped shape apartheid society, the antidote to which were
the provisions of the Constitution.
V CARMICHELE
The next major demand upon the Court to examine the common law
through the prism of the Constitution arose in Carmichele v Minister of
Safety and Security.31 Carmichele was brutally assaulted by a man who had
previously been convicted and charged with housebreaking and indecent
assault, for which he had been sentenced to a fine and a suspended period
of imprisonment. At the time of the attack on Carmichele, he had already
been charged with rape. Notwithstanding his previous criminal record,
when he appeared in the magistrates’ court on the rape charge, he was
28 See JC De Wet ‘Gemene reg of wetgewing’ (1948) 11 THRHR 1.
29 Du Plessis v De Klerk (n 22) 919 para 147.
30 Ibid at 927 para 163.
31 2001 (4) SA 938 (CC).
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released by the magistrate on his own recognisances. In doing this, the
magistrate followed the recommendation that the investigating police
officer had made in the face of representations made to the police and the
local prosecutor regarding the threat posed by the accused. He was
obviously a dangerous person but nothing could persuade the authorities
to keep him in custody pending his rape trial. After his release, he brutally
assaulted Carmichele.32
She sued both the Minister of Safety and Security and the Minster of
Justice and Constitutional Development. She claimed that members of
the police and the prosecution service had negligently failed to comply
with their legal duty to take steps to prevent the assailant from causing
harm.33 The trial judge held that there was no evidence on which the
court, on the basis of the existing law of delict (tort), could reasonably
find that the prosecutor or police had acted wrongfully. He granted an
order of absolution from the instance. This decision was confirmed by
the Supreme Court of Appeal.34
Carmichele then approached the Constitutional Court. Carmichele’s
argument was that, if they had developed the common law in terms of
s 39(2) of the Constitution, both the High Court and the Supreme Court
of Appeal would have found that there existed a legal duty upon the State
to protect citizens from violent criminals, the breach of which grounded
for a delictual action.
The task facing the Constitutional Court was to decide whether the
common law of delict required development beyond existing precedent;
this being a necessary condition for Carmichele to succeed. Judges
Ackermann and Goldstone set out the foundation upon which their joint
judgment was built as follows:
Our Constitution is not merely a formal document regulating public power.
It also embodies, like the German Constitution an objective, normative value
system. . .It is within the matrix of this objective normative value system that
the common law must be developed.35
The two judges noted that, not only must the common law be
developed in a way which meets the objectives of s 39(2) of the
Constitution, but this ‘must also be done in a way most appropriate for
the development of the common law within its own paradigm’.36
The judges noted that concepts such as ‘policy decisions’ and ‘value
judgements’, as well as society’s notion of ‘what justice demands’, might
32 Ibid paras 5–24.
33 Ibid para 25.
34 Ibid paras 25–26.
35 Ibid at 961 para 54.
36 Ibid at 962 para 55.
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have to be ‘replaced or supplemented and enriched by the appropriate
norms of the objective value system embodied in the Constitution’.37
After consideration of the alternatives in which the delictual concept of
lawfulness could be developed in the light of the values embodied in the
Constitution, Judges Ackermann and Goldstone concluded:
Our common law of delict spans many centuries and the debate regarding
delictual liability, its elements and their relationship to one another, remains
lively. Without the benefits of a fully considered judgment from either the
SCA or the High Court as to whether, from the perspective of the common
law, one solution would be better than any other, this Court is at a ‘‘grave
disadvantage’’. . .38
The Constitutional Court thus refused to make a final decision. On the
basis of the evidence presented, it concluded:
[T]he case for the appellant has sufficient merit to require careful consider-
ation to be given to the complex legal issues that it raises. . .It is not desirable
that a case as complex as this should be dealt with on the basis of what the facts
might be rather than what they are.39
Having concluded in principle that the negligence of a prosecutor
resulting in the release of a violent accused who then proceeds to
implement a threat can be a cause of a delictual action, the Court said: ‘A
strong case could be made for holding the prosecutor liable for the
damages suffered by the complainant.’40
On one level, the judgment represented an important development in
the law. The Court confirmed that the Constitution could not be
ignored in an action based on a common-law cause of action, where
existing precedent did not sustain such an action.
Notwithstanding this important conclusion, the judgment remains
highly confusing. For much of its analysis, it appears to be working with
the delictual concept of wrongfulness as the disputed element of delictual
liability. It then suddenly turns to emphasise the consequences of a
negligent failure by a prosecutor to act, adding to the confusion by the
employment of the concept of a legal duty owed by a prosecutor either to
the public generally or to a particular member thereof. This raises the
question whether the Court was dealing with the requirement of
negligence rather than wrongfulness.
In turn, this enquiry leads back to the Court’s analysis of the
relationship between the so-called objective normative value-system of
37 Ibid at 962 para 56.
38 Ibid at 963 para 58.
39 Ibid at 970–71 para 81.
40 Ibid at 968 para 74.
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the Constitution and the development of the common law. Not only is
there no indication as to the content of this objective normative value
system, but there is also a lack of analysis regarding the scope and
meaning of the very constitutional section employed by the Court to link
the Constitution with the common law, namely s 39(2) of the Constitu-
tion. For example, if the Court was dealing with wrongfulness, then a
clear, coherent application of its observation about the role of the
normative system would have been instructive. Wrongfulness could have
been given content through the normative system. Not only did this not
happen but the reason for this failure is unclear. Either the Court
considered this to be a developmental bridge too far or it had shifted its
attention to the requirement of negligence. Whatever the answer, little of
our law of delict had changed save for the broadest of indications
regarding its future direction, which was not much different from
pre-constitutional methodology.
The wording of s 39(2) is important – ‘when interpreting any
legislation and when developing the common law, every court, tribunal or
forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.’
The judgment in Carmichele gives no indication as to when this
development is mandated nor as to the particular steps which are to be
taken in achieving this development. The wording of this section does
not impose a mandatory obligation to develop the common law in terms
of the Constitution; rather it requires of the court, when it decides to
develop the common law, that it must ‘promote the spirit purport and
objects of the Bill of Rights’.
In any event, s 39(2) did not percolate into the Constitutional Court’s
judgment. In summary, save for informing the legal community that the
Constitution contains an objective, normative value system and that ‘our
common law spans many centuries’, there was little in the judgment to
indicate how the process of the development of the common law would
now take place nor was there a scintilla of suggestion as to whether the
manner in which the common law had been developed prior to the
advent of constitutional democracy was different from that to be adopted
by courts after 1994, save for the notion of supplementation by
undefined norms.
The absence of any guidance as to the transformative potential of the
Constitution or of the development of the common law has meant that,
in a series of subsequent cases, particularly in the area of contract, the
existing body of common law has been left almost immune from
engagement with the foundational values of the Constitution. The
essentially individualistic nature of the law of contract, bequeathed to
South Africa by its pre-constitutional past, has continued to operate, long
after the Carmichele decision. That case afforded an opportunity to
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examine the foundations of the common law in order to guide the courts
of South Africa beyond the individualistic premises upon which much
private law had been predicated.41
Arguably the most significant implication to draw from Carmichele is
the following: The common law has developed over centuries. It
constitutes a repository of great wisdom. Its mysteries are best unravelled
by specialists who reside in the Supreme Court of Appeal and High
Courts. We, as the Constitutional Court, can but engage in gentle,
generalised jurisprudential prodding.42
VI THE GENERAL DIGNITY JURISPRUDENCE
So far this paper has considered judgments relating exclusively to private
law. Without straying too far from this focus, it is important to reinforce
the link between the individualism exhibited in the judgments examined,
together with the absence of any examination of the concept of power,
and the early dignity jurisprudence of the Court in which Judge
Ackermann was a prominent author. This link can be established by a
brief analysis of Ackermann J’s important judgment in National Coalition
for Gay and Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice.43
The matter came to the Constitutional Court by way of confirmation
of a declaration of constitutional invalidity of legislation which included
the crime of sodomy. The Constitutional Court was asked to confirm a
declaration by the High Court that these common-law offences were
inconsistent with the Constitution as were similar legislative provisions.
In upholding the declaration of invalidity, Judge Ackermann took the
opportunity again to assert the right to dignity as ‘a cornerstone of our
Constitution’.44 The following passage from his judgment echoes Ferreira,
in which individual freedom was asserted to be the cornerstone of the
Constitution, and similarly the individualised right to dignity:
Dignity is a difficult concept to capture in precise terms. At its least, it is clear
that the constitutional protection of dignity requires us to acknowledge the
value and worth of all individuals as members of our society. The
41 See Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 (4) SA 1 (SCA); Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 (6) SA
21 (SCA). See also L Hawthorne ‘Distribution of wealth: The dependency theory and the law
of contract’ (2006) 69 THRHR 48. Later Constitutional Court cases have done very little to
move the framework beyond that of Carmichele. See for example Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5)
SA 323 (CC). The minority judgments of Moseneke DCJ and Sachs J do, however, illustrate
the possibility of a different approach to the common law.
42 The advent of the Constitution and the express provisions of ss 8 and 39(2) notwith-
standing, there is precious little difference between the approach adopted in Carmichele and that
of Minister van Polisie v Ewels 1975 (3) SA 590 (A) to the development of the common law of
delict, even though Ewels was decided in the heart of the Apartheid darkness in 1975.
43 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC).
44 Ibid at 28 para 28.
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common-law prohibition on sodomy criminalises all sexual intercourse per
anum between men regardless of the relationship of the couple who engage
therein, or the age of such couple, or the place where it occurs, or indeed of
any other circumstances whatsoever. . . . There can be no doubt that the
existence of a law which punishes a form of sexual expression for gay men
degrades and devalues gay men in our broader society.45
Judge Ackermann went on to state that the breach of the right to
dignity did not mean that the right to privacy had not also been breached.
He confirmed that the right to privacy recognised the right ‘to a sphere of
private intimacy and autonomy which allows us to establish and nurture
human relationships without interference from the outside commu-
nity’.46
Judge Ackermann roundly rejected arguments to the effect that the
Court’s equality jurisprudence did not give sufficient weight to principles
of substantive equality and that it was predicated excessively on an
individualistic concept of dignity. The dignitarian approach to equality
had initially been adopted by the Court in President of the Republic of South
Africa and another v Hugo.47 Significantly, in Hugo’s case the Court stated:
At the heart of the prohibition of unfair discrimination lies a recognition that
the purpose of our new constitutional government and democratic order is
the establishment of a society in which all human beings will be accorded
equal dignity and respect regardless of their membership of particular
groups.48
If this phrase may have appeared to be ambiguous, the Court then
clarified its meaning by the express approval of a dictum in Egan v
Canada,49 a decision of the Canadian Supreme Court:
This Court has recognised that inherent human dignity is at the heart of
individual rights in a free and democratic society. . . . More than any other
right in the Charter, s 15 [the equality right] gives effect to this notion. . . .
Equality, as that concept is enshrined as a fundamental right within s 15 of the
Charter, means nothing if it does not represent the commitment to
recognising each person’s equal worth as a human being, regardless of
individual differences.50
To the extent that there might be any dispute about the individualistic
content given to dignity as well as equality by Judge Ackermann, he
clarified his position in an academic article written somewhat later:
45 Ibid at 28–9 para 28.
46 Ibid at 30 para 32.
47 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC).
48 Ibid at 22–3 para 41.
49 (1995) 29 CRR (2d) 79.
50 Cited by Goldstone J in Hugo (n 47) at 23 para 41.
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What lay at the heart of the apartheid pathology was the extensive and
sustained attempt to deny to the majority of the South African population the
right of self-identification and self determination. That state did its best to
deny to blacks that which is definitional to being human, namely the ability to
understand or at least define oneself to choose ones own powers and to act
freely as a moral agent pursuant to such understanding of self-definition.
Blacks were treated as a means to an end hardly ever as an end, to themselves,
an almost complete reversal of the Kantian imperative and concept of priceless
inner worth and dignity.51
VII THE EFFECT OF THESE JUDGMENTS
The cases analysed in this paper support the view that Judge Ackermann’s
approach spawned a jurisprudence of individualism. At the heart of this
constitutional enterprise is the autonomy of the individual. This
approach is articulated best in Judge Ackermann’s minority judgment in
Ferreira, but also finds expression in the other judgments which have been
the subject of analysis in this paper. In turn, it is this individualism which
lies at the heart of the body of common law which was inherited from the
South African past.
Any doubt there may have been that it is individualism upon which
the body of common law is predicated, was removed in the eloquent
judgment of Judge Edwin Cameron in Brisley v Drotsky.52 In dealing with
the question whether contractual freedom can be limited by our law,
particularly in the light of fundamental constitutional values, Judge
Cameron held that, ‘[c]ontractual autonomy informs also the constitu-
tional value of dignity’.53 In support of this conclusion, Judge Cameron
cites H L A Hart’s The Concept of Law:
Rules conferring private powers must, if they are to be understood, be looked
at from the point of view of those who exercise them. They appear then as an
additional element introduced by the law into social life over and above that
of coercive control. This is so because possession of these legal powers makes
of the private citizen, who, if there were no such rules, would be a mere
duty-bearer, a private legislator. He is made competent to determine the
course of the law within the sphere of his contracts, trusts, wills and other
structures of rights and duties which he is enabled to build.54
This was the basic premise of the common law, prior to the
encrustations of race which were added, mainly after 1948. A libertarian,
51 L W H Ackermann ‘The legal nature of the South African constitutional revolution’
(2004) 4 New Zealand Law Journal 650. For a comprehensive analysis of differing approaches to
dignity, the complexity of which falls outside this paper, see S Woolman ‘Dignity’ in S
Woolman et al (eds) Constitutional Law of South Africa 2 ed (Original Service, 2006) Ch 36.
52 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA).
53 Ibid at 35 para 94.
54 Ibid at 35–6 para 94.
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who viewed the common law in this fashion, would enthusiastically
support a declaration of constitutional invalidity of any common-law or
legislative rule that impeded the right of individual autonomy. Viewed in
its best possible light, this appears to be the fundamental thrust of the
jurisprudence of Judge Ackermann. I accept that in Ferreira, as well as in
the Gay and Lesbian case, Judge Ackermann endorsed the need for social
and economic change, but the express constitutional text made it difficult
to avoid such an endorsement.55 The point, however, is to probe his
foundational approach and its link to the common law. The argument is
that at root individualism was seen as the foundation of the constitutional
enterprise, a result that is found when the examination bores down to the
core of the approach. It is here that the jurisprudence of Judge
Ackermann exhibits the element of mourning.
VIII MOURNING
In a number of works, Jacques Derrida considers two models of the type
of encroachment between the self and the other that are regularly
associated with mourning. Drawing upon the Freudian concept of
mourning, Derrida draws a distinction between introjection, love for the
other in me, and incorporation, retaining the other as a foreign body
within my own body. For Freud and for the more contemporary
psychologists Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok, on whose work
Derrida further draws for inspiration, successful mourning primarily
concerns the introjection of the other. The preservation of the other as a
discrete body inside the self, as in the case of incorporation is considered
to be where mourning ceases to be a ‘normal’ and rather a pathological
response.
As often in his works, Derrida reverses the hierarchy by emphasising
that there is a sense in which the pathological condition of incorporation
can be more respectful of the alterity of the other person. Incorporation,
in effect, means that I have not totally assimilated the other. By contrast,
Abraham and Torok’s idea of ‘normal mourning’ can be seen to be
interiorising the other person to such an extent that the one is assimilated
or cannibalised into the other. Derrida nevertheless refuses to endorse
unreservedly the incorporation of the other person as an adequate
reflection of ‘successful’ mourning. He accepts that the more the self
55 After all, even Adam Smith argued for the State to take an active role when he wrote that
‘those exertions of the natural liberty of a few individuals, which may endanger the security of
the whole society, are and ought to be, restrained by the laws of all governments’. A Smith An
Enquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1937) at 353. Smith was not referring
to national security but to the excessive power of banks and financial institutions.
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‘keeps the foreign element inside itself the more it excludes it’.56 If we
refuse to engage with the dead ‘other’, Derrida argues, we exclude their
foreignness from ourselves and therefore prevent any transformative
interaction with them. When fetishised in their externality, the dead
‘other’ is actually lifeless and can subvert the transformational opportu-
nity. The crisp point made by Derrida is that, in that process of mourning,
‘the otherness of the other’ person resists both the process of incorpora-
tion and the process of introjection. Responsibility towards the ‘other’ is
about respecting and even emphasizing this resistance.57
Viewed within this context, the jurisprudence of Laurie Ackermann, as
examined in this paper, involves a refusal to engage with the dead ‘other’,
that is, with the common law, which was essential to the commercial,
economic and social intercourse until 1994 when South Africa became a
democracy. Consequently, his jurisprudence does not seek to exclude
that body of law from the newly created body of law nor is there a serious
interaction between common-law precedent and constitutional possibil-
ity which could give rise to a transformative interaction.
The Constitutional Court began the development of its jurisprudence
in the case of Zuma by emphasising that, absent apartheid history and its
effect on the South African legal system, much of the content of the Bill
of Rights as contained in the Constitution would be unnecessary as it was
already enshrined in the common law. The implication was that the
Constitution’s purpose was to purge the body of South African law of the
apartheid cancer and, accordingly, to work pure the body of common
law. The common law, particularly South African private law, was based
centrally on individualistic core premises. For example, the common law
of contract was predicated on the primary informing value of individual
autonomy and hence recognition of the unfettered freedom of con-
tract.58
The concept of individual autonomy finds its constitutional proclama-
tion in Ferreira, where Judge Ackermann saw the notion of negative
liberty as the residual value within the South African Constitution. In
Hugo and the cases that followed, the Court embarked upon the further
development of an individualistic conception of dignity which became
the foundational value in its early constitutional jurisprudence. Even
when the Court was forced to engage constitutionally with the law of
delict in the Carmichele case, it failed to provide any guidance as to how
the objective normative framework of the Constitution, undeveloped as
56 J Derrida ‘Fors: the anglish words of Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok’ in N Abraham &
M Torok The Wolf Man’s Magic Word: A Cryptonymy (1986) at xvii.
57 J Derrida Memoirs for Paul De Man (1989) 160.
58 See M Hogg and G Lubbe ‘Formation of contract’ in R Zimmermann, D Visser and K
Reid Mixed Legal Systems in Comparative Perspective (2004) at 36.
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it might have been in that judgment, could assist in examining the extent
to which the old body of common law could remain in the new body,
being created out of the mandated constitutional framework.
The cases analysed in this paper are indicative of the prodigious,
learned and meticulously-crafted judgments of Laurie Ackermann. Few
judges in this country have been his equal in delivering a well-crafted,
erudite judgment. But the jurisprudence offered by the Court appeared
to work with a timeless quality of existing common law. There was little
examination of the extent to which the Constitution demanded an
engagement between the old and new in order to construct a new body,
or, to employ the description of Gillian Rose, a new story. In significant
areas of private law, as in the law of contract, the old story dominated,
almost as if the Constitution never existed.
Further, the individualistic concept of dignity continues to hold
significant sway in a broader context. For example, in S v Jordan,59 Judges
O’Regan and Sachs describe the significance of the decision in the
National Coalition v Minister of Justice case thus:
The judgment accordingly emphasises the interaction between equality,
dignity and privacy in relation to a community that has been discriminated
against on the basis of closely-held personal characteristics. Furthermore, it
stresses that the protective sphere of private intimacy and autonomy relates to
establishing and nurturing human relationships.60
IX CONCLUSION
As already noted, two dominant models of adjudication emerged out of
apartheid – a libertarian one, suspicious of state power, and an uncritical
acceptance of the law as an instrument of social engineering. In 1994,
when South Africa began its constitutional journey, it commenced on the
basis of a text which proclaimed the need to transform South African
society into an egalitarian community. That demanded more than a
recourse to libertarian autonomy or to an unfettered and unaccountable
exercise of social engineering by the state. The point of this paper is that
in mourning the glorious common law of the past, the opportunity was
lost to develop a new story which could have given rise to an adjudicative
framework in closer accordance with the constitutional vision. A new
story still remains to be told, the admirable industry of Laurie Ackermann
notwithstanding. Perhaps that story could be based on the alternative
reading of the Constitution offered earlier in this paper.
Andre van der Walt has eloquently summarised the argument of this
59 S v Jordan 2002 (6) SA 642 (CC).
60 Ibid at 675 para 82.
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paper, and hence the effect of telling the same story, with the following
story of his own:61
A few weeks ago, a long-lost and forgotten painting was discovered during
the restoration of the old Palace of Justice in Pretoria. The painting, executed
in 1692 by seventeenth-century Dutch master Jan Weenix, shows Johannes
Voet (1647 – 1713), dressed in lawyer’s robes, sitting at his desk with a closed
copy of Corpus Iuris Civilis at his elbow, and with an open book – possibly a
part of his influential Commentarius ad Pandectas – on which he is working.
The discovery of the painting was met with enthusiastic comments from
prominent lawyers, who pointed out the symbolic value of this painting of
Voet, whose works formed ‘the backbone of our law’ during the nineteenth
century and the early part of this century. This enthusiasm about the symbolic
value of this painting reminds one of the view, expressed by eminent lawyers
such as the current Chief Justice, that the Roman-Dutch tradition was not
fundamentally tainted by the decades of apartheid, and that it, like the old
Palace of Justice and the painting of Voet, could and should be restored to its
former glory and receive its due place of honour in the legal system of the new
South Africa. The analysis above suggests, in my view, that we should perhaps
not be quite so enthusiastic about the future of our tradition, and that we
should resist rather than welcome its influence on the tradition of our future.
The Department of Justice obviously thinks that the painting of Voet should
receive a place of honour in the newly restored court complex, . . . once it has
been restored.
I, for one, would like to see the painting go to an art museum. We should
not have a painting of Voet on a wall of the Palace of Justice for the same
reason that we should not have a stuffed parrot on the shelf in front of which
we say our prayers.
61 AJ van der Walt ‘Un-doing things with words: The colonisation of the public sphere by
private property discourse’ 1998 Acta Juridica 270 at 280–81.
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